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HIGHER EDUCATION, HARASSMENT, AND
FIRST AMENDMENT OPPORTUNISM
Kenneth L. Marcus*
INTRODUCTION
The University of California at Irvine (Irvine) has recently emerged as an
unexpected battleground in the roiling campus wars over the First Amendment and
the doctrine of academic freedom. Irvine made national headlines this past fall with
its decision to fire leading constitutional law scholar Erwin Chemerinsky, just one
day after hiring him as the founding dean of its new law school.' Chemerinsky had
reportedly angered Irvine's chancellor by publishing a potentially controversial op-
ed in the Los Angeles Times on the day his appointment was announced. The move
was widely disparaged across the political spectrum as a violation of Chemerinsky' s
academic freedom. 3 Under considerable public pressure, Irvine's chancellor reversed
* Lillie and Nathan Ackerman Chair in Equality and Justice in America, Baruch College
School of Public Affairs, The City University of New York; Staff Director, U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights (2004-2008); delegated the authority of Assistant Secretary of Education for
Civil Rights (2003-2004); General Deputy Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity (2001-2002). This Article was
prepared for delivery at the College of William and Mary Symposium, "Conflicts 101:
Higher Education and the First Amendment." Some portions were also presented at the
University of California at Irvine, San Francisco State University, and San Jose State
University. The author is indebted to Frederick Schauer for suggesting the relevance of "First
Amendment opportunism" to anti-Semitism on college campuses; to Ira C. Lupu for valuable
comments on the symposium presentation; and to Susan Tuchman and Manuel Gomez for
the differing insights that they have provided. The views presented here are the author's own
and may not reflect the views of either the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights or the U.S.
Department of Education.
See, e.g., Editorial, A Bad Beginning in Irvine, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2007, at A20;
Gillian Flaccus, UC Campus Withdraws Deanship Offer to Legal Scholar Chemerinsky,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 13, 2007; Sonya Geis, Scholars Decry Law School's About-Face
on New Dean, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2007, at A2; Tom Tugend, Campus Clash, BALT.
JEWISH TIMES, Sept. 21, 2007, at 47; William F. West, Law School Dean Offer Scuttled,
HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Sept. 13, 2007, at Cl.
2 Geis, supra note 1. Dean Chemerinsky reported that Chancellor Michael V. Drake told
him that he "knew I was liberal but didn't know how controversial I would be," and that the
University of California regents would have "a bloody fight" over approval. Id.
3 See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, In Chemerinsky's Defense: No Matter What Your
Politics, UC Irvine's Treatment of the Legal Scholar Was Wrong, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13,
2007, at Al 9; Editorial, Respected but Rejected: Rescinding Erwin Chemerinsky's Job Offer
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his decision again, hastily re-hiring Chemerinsky.4 What was stunning here is that
Irvine failed to identify the free speech issue until it was publicly humiliated for fail-
ing to do so. Then again, the question as to when we acknowledge the First Amend-
ment's coverage (and that of its related doctrines) has always been a mysterious one.5
The deeper irony here is that Irvine's leadership was hardly ignorant of the
sensitivity of campus speech issues at the time of the so-called "L'Affair
Chemerinsky." Indeed, at the same time that Irvine was making national headlines
for its apparent hard line against academic free speech at its law school, it was
aggressively taking the opposite position when it came to harassment charges
brought on behalf of Jewish undergraduates.6 Specifically, Irvine was asserting the
First Amendment as a defense in an investigation conducted by the U.S. Department
of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR) to determine whether Irvine had
impermissibly allowed an environment hostile to Jewish students to develop on its
campus, as well as in related proceedings before the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights.7 In other words, Irvine was arguing before the federal government that
as UC Irvine's Founding Law Dean Was an Act of Cowardice, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2007,
at A18; Posting of Ilya Somin to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://www.volokh.com (Sept. 12,
2007, 17:22 EST).
4 Garrett Therolf & Richard C. Paddock, Law Dean Is Rehired as Furor Goes On, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 18,2007, at A 1; Jon Wiener, Chemerinsky andIrvine: What Happened?, INSIDE
HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 24, 2007, http://www.insidehighered.conviews/2007/09/24/wiener.
' See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1765, 1767 (2004) [hereinafter
Schauer, Boundaries] (discussing the boundaries on the applicability of the First Amendment).
6 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CAMPUS ANTI-SEMrrISM: BRIEFING REPORT 66-67
(2006), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/081506campusantibrief07.pdf [hereinafter
CAMPUS ANrI-SEMmSM].
' Id. Irvine has repeatedly asserted its First Amendment argument in public defenses of
its alleged non-responsiveness to anti-Semitic behavior. See, e.g., Reut Cohen, Jewish
Students Discuss Vandalism with Chancellor, CAMPUS J., Oct. 24, 2006, available at
http://www.campusj.com/2006/10/ 24/jewish-students-discuss-vandalism-with-chancellUor/
(reporting that Vice Chancellor Manuel Gomez responded to anti-Semitic vandalism by
commenting that "one person's hate speech is another person's education" (quoting
Chancellor Michael B. Drake's insistence that there is no distinction between protected free
speech and hateful anti-Semitic speech)); Michael Miller & Heidi Schultheis, Political
Events Converge at UCI: Speeches and a Rally Wednesday Address Recent Controversy
About Tolerance and Religion at School, DAILY PILOT (Newport Beach, Ca.), May 31, 2006,
available athttp://www.dailypilot.com/articles/2007/053I education/dpt-uci31 .prt (reporting
that, "[riather than directly comment on the allegations of anti-Semitism, the chancellor
spoke at length about the 1 st Amendment and especially about free speech"); H.G. Reza, UC
Irvine Chancellor Calls Harsh Speech Free Speech; Michael V. Drake Tells Concerned Jews
that Muslims on Campus Have the Right to Vent, L.A. TIMES, May 31,2007, at B 1 (reporting
Chancellor Drake's insistence, in speaking to a Jewish community audience that Irvine
campus events considered by some to be anti-Semitic are actually examples of
constitutionally protected expression); Editorial, UCI Falls Short on a Test of Leadership:
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academic free speech is so important as to outweigh the public importance of
enforcing federal antidiscrimination laws. In light of Irvine's treatment of Dean
Chemerinsky, critics have inevitably questioned whether its academic freedom
posture is hypocritical (or pre-textual) in the OCR case.8 Even if the Chemerinsky
matter had not occurred, however, the university's reliance on the First Amendment
would nevertheless raise difficult questions. "What becomes interesting," as
Catharine MacKinnon once observed, "is when the First Amendment frame is
invoked and when it is not."9
Nowadays, it is not surprising to hear the First Amendment invoked in virtually
any campus controversy. Stanley Fish has commented that crying "First Amend-
ment" is the modem equivalent to crying "Wolf!"' 0 "In the academy," he argued,
"the First Amendment... is invoked ritually when there are no First Amendment
issues in sight"'-and in particular, as if to prophesy the Irvine case, in cases
Defending Free Speech Is Responsible, But So Is Denouncing Hateful Speech, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., June 1, 2007, available at http://www.ocregister.com/ocregister/opinion/
editorials/article_1714926.ph (applauding Chancellor Drake's defense of the First
Amendment but criticizing his refusal to condemn anti-Semitic hate speech).
8 Susan Estrich, for example, argued that:
[Chancellor] Drake has a twisted view of academic freedom, one that
allows Muslim students to engage in open anti-Semitism, to hold rallies
on campus attacking Zionist control of the media, equating Jewish
support for Israel with Hitler's Nazis, even (according to campus
Republicans) displacing previously scheduled Young Republicans
meetings with rallies denouncing Israel's right to exist. But there's no
room for a liberal, Jewish law professor who is routinely the object of
bidding wars between top-rated law schools vying for his services.
Susan Estrich, The Most Corrupt Man in California, CREATORS.COM, Sept. 14, 2007, http://
www.creators.com/opinion/susan-estrich/the-most-corrupt-man-in-california.html.
9 CATHARINE A. MACKiNNON, ONLY WORDS 12 (1993).
'0 Stanley Fish, The Free-Speech Follies, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 13, 2003,
available at http://chronicle.com/jobs/news/2003/06/2003061301c/ ("Take the case of the
editors of college newspapers who will always cry First Amendment when something
they've published turns out to be the cause of outrage and controversy. These days the
offending piece or editorial or advertisement usually involves (what is at least perceived to
be) an attack on Jews.").
" Id. Fish may be ironically accurate in his polemical characterization of higher
education opportunism, but if so, he is not right in the way that he intends. If anything, he
is right only to the extent that he makes "opportunistic" use of the opportunism concept in
precisely the manner that he criticizes. To say that the First Amendment is invoked where
there is no First Amendment argument in sight, after all, is not necessarily to identify a
doctrinal error, as Fish appears to believe. After all, much modem First Amendment law
originated in this manner. Unlike Fish, who has deployed the concept for polemical purposes,
Schauer emphasizes not only opportunism's pejorative but also its favorable connotations.
Schauer notes that the term "opportunistic" is a "word that hovers precariously between the
pejorative and the complimentary." Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in
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involving Jews.'2 Crying "First Amendment" in response to harassment claims,
however, is not just a matter of crying "Wolf." For many years, this realm of
regulatory activity was immune to First Amendment challenges altogether.13 Today,
by contrast, free speech claims are sometimes raised in the context of hate or bias
incidents which do not include even incidental use of words or which use words
only in support of threatening behavior.
At Irvine, according to numerous allegations, Jewish students have been
ridiculed, threatened, stalked, and intimidated, and Jewish property has been
vandalized. 4 Jewish students have been told to, "Go back to Russia where you
ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 176 (Lee C. Bollinger &
Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2001) [hereinafter Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism]. His
argument is not that opportunists misuse established doctrine; rather, it is that the boundaries
within which First Amendment doctrine is conventionally applied have not themselves been
doctrinally established, that they shift from time to time, and that opportunists continually
apply the doctrine in novel areas where it is not well suited. Id. Nevertheless, Fish's argument
is clearly tiuc, even if it is not true in the way that he intends. Many in higher education who
cry "First Amendment!" in the face of anti-Semitic harassment frequently are opportunists,
consciously or unconsciously, pushing the boundaries of constitutional discourse into an area
to which it was not previously extended-and to which it is not well suited.
12 By way of example, Fish cited a University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana student
newspaper which printed a letter arguing that "Jews Manipulate America" and urging the
President to "separate Jews from all government advisory positions" lest they "face another
Holocaust." Fish, supra note 10. Additionally, Fish cited a Santa Rosa Junior College student
article which answered in the affirmative the title question: "Is Anti-Semitism Ever the Result
of Jewish Behavior?" Id. In both cases, Fish argued that First Amendment claims raised in
response to the inevitable uproar were inapposite. Id. Student editors, he explained, have no
First Amendment obligation to print objectionable articles and no constitutional protection
from the moral outrage which their poor judgment may provoke. Id. Similarly, Fish argued
that the Harvard education department thrice made a fool of itself when it invited, disinvited,
and then reinvited controversial poet Tom Paulin to be its Morris Gray Lecturer. Id. As Fish
relates, Paulin had denied Israel's right to exist, said that West Bank settlers "should be shot
dead," and claimed that Israeli police and military forces "were the equivalent of the Nazi SS."
Id. A department spokesman claimed that the reinvitation "was a clear affirmation that the
department stood strongly by the First Amendment." Id. In fact, Fish argued, Paulin had no
First Amendment right to the invitation, and the department had no obligations other than
those that it had brought upon itself through its own poor judgment. Id.
'3 See MACKINNON, supra note 9, at 49-50; Robert Post, Sexual Harassment and the
First Amendment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 382, 383 (Catharine A.
MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004); Frederick Schauer, The Speech-ing of Sexual
Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 347 (Catharine A. MacKinnon
& Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) [hereinafter Schauer, Speech-ing].
14 See Susan B. Tuchman, Statement Submitted to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
Briefing on Campus Anti-Semitism, in CAMPUS ANTI-SEMrIsM, supra note 6, at 14-18; Marc
Ballon, Campus Turmoil: Jewish Students and Activists Call UC Irvine a Hotbed of Anti-
Semitic Harassment, JEWISH J., Mar. 11, 2005, available at http://www.jewishjoumal.com/
home/searchview.php?id= 13779. The Irvine case is discussed in greater detail in Kenneth
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came from" and called a "dirty Jew" and a "Fing Jew.' 5 In one incident, a rock
was thrown at a Jewish student wearing a T-shirt with a pro-Israel message. 6
Students have been heard uttering the Arab phrase which translates as "Slaughter the
Jews."' 17 A Holocaust memorial was badly damaged.' University administration
has been charged with failing to respond meaningfully to allegations, advising at
least one complainant to seek psychological counseling. 9 University administrators
have repeatedly insisted that the First Amendment prevents them from taking any
action unless students are threatened physically.20 Interestingly, many of the
incidents have entailed the use of words, but some have not. Rock-throwing and
stalking, for example, do not even involve the use of words, although they may
communicate a message (e.g., "Jews are not welcome here").
These incidents highlight a puzzling phenomenon in contemporary constitu-
tional culture. The puzzle has been the relatively recent appearance and eager
acceptance, especially in higher education, of First Amendment or academic
freedom arguments in areas which had long been beyond their reach. For at least
the "first fifteen years of its development," the law of harassment had been well-
understood to regulate a sphere of constitutionally unprotected, proscribable
conduct, even when it incidentally included the use of words.2' Yet in recent years
free-speech arguments have become a favorite topic-changing device for defenders
of all forms of harassment, 22 especially in post-secondary education where many are
especially sensitized to issues of free speech and academic freedom. The tendency
to construct harassing conduct as speech has important ramifications since the
appearance of the First Amendment, with its powerful array of standards and
presumptions, augurs ill for any area of regulation which is brought within its
shifting boundaries. As Frederick Schauer put it, "Once the First Amendment shows
up, much of the game is over., 23 And indeed, arguably, the game may now be over
for harassment law, which is to say, free speech issues may have obtained too much
L. Marcus, Anti-Zionism as Racism: Campus Anti-Semitism and the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
15 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 837, 853-55 (2007).
"5 Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), Mem. in Supp. of Its Title VI Claims Against
the University of California, Irvine 11 (Case No. 09-05-2013) (on file with William & Mary
Bill of Rights Journal) [hereinafter ZOA]; Tuchman, supra note 14, at 17.
16 Tuchman, supra note 14, at 17.
17 id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 15-16.
20 ZOA, supra note 15, at 11.
21 See Schauer, Speech-ing, supra note 13, at 347; see also MACKINNON, supra note 9,
at 49-50; Post, supra note 13, at 383.
22 Schauer, Speech-ing, supra note 13, at 355 (attributing this insight as applied to sexual
harassment to Judith Resnik).
23 Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 5, at 1767.
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traction in this area to be dismissed out of hand. On the other hand, it remains at
best unclear as to whether the First Amendment is even salient as to this area of law.
The appearance of the First Amendment in this area was likely hastened by
overreaching on the part of civil rights advocates who, during the 1980s and 1990s,
introduced campus speech codes which could not help but raise First Amendment
attention.24 For many years, this conflict played itself out in a series of arguments
about campus speech codes, which were devised to protect various groups from
expressions which might be considered offensive or "hateful."' While these codes
drew some support from academic commentators, 26 the courts generally found them
to violate the First Amendment and other commentators agreed.27 Interestingly, few
24 See, for example, the powerful critiques provided in DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, You CAN'T
SAY THAT!: THE GROWING THREAT TO CIVIL LIBERTIES FROM ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS
59-72 (2003); ALAN CHARLES KORS & HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THE SHADOW
UNIVERSITY: THE BETRAYAL OF LIBERTY ON AMERICA'S CAMPUSES (1998).
2 See, e.g., Jack M. Battaglia, Regulation of Hate Speech by Educational Institutions: A
P,,pused Poiicy, 3i SANTA CLARA L. REV. 345 (1991); Alan E. Brownstein, Hate Speech and
Harassment: The Constitutionality of Campus Codes That Prohibit Racial Insults, 3 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 179 (1994); Lawrence Friedman, Regulating Hate Speech at Public
Universities After R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 37 HOw. L.J. 1 (1993); Richard A. Glenn & Otis
H. Stephens, Campus Hate Speech and Equal Protection: Competing Constitutional Values,
6 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 349 (1997); Patricia B. Hodulik, Prohibiting Discriminatory Harassment
by Regulating Student Speech: A Balancing of First-Amendment and University Interests, 16
J.C. & U.L. 573 (1990); Jens B. Koepke, The University of California Hate Speech Policy: A
Good Heart in Ill-Fitting Garb, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 599 (1990); Brendan P.
Lynch, Personal Injuries or Petty Complaints?: Evaluating the Case for Campus Hate Speech
Codes: The Argument from Experience, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 613 (1999); David F.
McGowan & Ragesh K. Tangri, A Libertarian Critique of University Restrictions of Offensive
Speech, 79 CAL. L. REV. 825 (1991); Thomas A. Schweitzer, Hate Speech on Campus and the
FirstAmendment: Can They Be Reconciled?, 27 CONN. L. REV. 493 (1995); Robert A. Sedler,
The Unconstitutionality of Campus Bans on "Racist Speech:" The View from Without and
Within, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 631 (1992); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484; James Weinstein, A Constitutional
Roadmap to the Regulation of Campus Hate Speech, 38 WAYNE L. REV. 163 (1991); Nicholas
Wolfson, Free Speech Theory and Hateful Words, 60 U. CN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Carol L. Zeiner,
Zoned Out! Examining Campus Speech Zones, 66 LA. L. REV. 1 (2005).
26 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in
Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 345 (1991); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let
Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 436-37; Man J.
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L.
REv. 2320, 2356-58 (1989).
27 See, e.g., Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding a
university speech code unconstitutional); Iota XI Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George
Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386, 393 (4th Cir. 1993) (applying First Amendment protections to
a fraternity's "ugly woman contest" and holding a university cannot selectively limit speech);
Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 867-73 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (striking down portions
of a campus speech code on First Amendment grounds); UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents
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institutions have withdrawn speech or harassment codes unless threatened with the
risk of litigation or faced with adverse judicial decisions, and many apparently
remain on the books.28
At the same time, however, most universities have also promulgated anti-
discrimination and harassment policies pursuant to the requirements of various
federal civil rights statutes (especially Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196429 and
Title IX3" of the Education Amendments Act).3' Unlike hate speech codes,
harassment regulations (such as the federal regulations or public universities'
implementing policies) are not directly aimed at speech, although the harassing
conduct they regulate may include words.32 Given the prominence of speech
interests to the academic setting, however, free speech claims are now regularly
raised in response to various allegations of harassment; this is nowhere more true
than with respect to allegations of anti-Semitic harassment. Indeed, Justice Kennedy
once remarked in dissent that federal education harassment law is "circumscribed
of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (applying First Amendment
doctrines of overbreadth, fighting words, and vagueness to a campus speech code); Doe v.
Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 861-67 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (applying the vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines to a campus speech code).
For commentators who agree that campus speech codes violate the First Amendment,
see, for example, Lee Ann Rabe, Sticks and Stones: The First Amendment and Campus
Speech Codes, 37 J. MARSHALLL. REv. 205 (2003); Suzanna Sherry, Speaking of Virtue: A
Republican Approach to University Regulation of Hate Speech, 75 MINN. L. REv. 933,
941-44 (1991); Strossen, supra note 25, passim.
28 One study found widespread post-secondary non-compliance with judicial decisions
on this subject, based on higher education community dissatisfaction with the decisions. Jon
B. Gould, The Precedent That Wasn't: College Hate Speech Codes and the Two Faces of
Legal Compliance, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 345, 345, 387-88 (2001).
29 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
30 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2000).
"1 See Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees,
Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (Mar. 13, 1997); Racial Incidents and
Harassment Against Students at Educational Institutions; Investigative Guidance, 59 Fed.
Reg. 11,448 (Mar. 10, 1994).
32 Some strong First Amendment advocates support harassment bans while opposing
speech codes. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, supra note 25, at 490 ("The ACLU never has
argued that harassing, intimidating, or assaultive conduct should be immunized simply
because it is in part based on words."). Others strongly assert First Amendment claims in
defense of harassing speech. See, e.g., Robert W. Gall, The University as an Industrial Plant:
How a Workplace Theory of Discriminatory Harassment Creates a "Hostile Environment"
for Free Speech in America's Universities, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Fall 1997, at 203
(explaining that the application of hostile environment theory in the university setting tends
to stifle academic freedom); Eugene Volokh, Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace
Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1791 (1992) (arguing that harassment laws should be
carefully analyzed under the First Amendment).
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by the First Amendment,"33 and federal regulatory policy has assumed this to be so
for over a decade. 34 Nevertheless, there is reason to question the validity of this
assumption and the salience of free speech to the regulation of education harassment.
To the extent that harassment regulation encompasses some speech activities by
state actors on the basis of content, the most difficult constitutional question may be
whether First Amendment doctrine even applies to such questions or whether they
lay outside of the boundaries of First Amendment coverage. 35 This Article will
argue that the salience of the First Amendment to questions of academic harassment
is at best unsettled; that efforts to apply First Amendment doctrine to harassment
law may be seen as a form of what Frederick Schauer has described as "First
Amendment opportunism; ' 36 and that such efforts to extend the boundaries of the
First Amendment are ultimately unresolvable on the basis of constitutional doctrine
alone. Special attention is given to the recently resurgent problem of campus anti-
Semitism because harassment allegations under this rubric have been subjected to
frequent, intense challenge as of late.37
33 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 667 (1999) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) ("A university's power to discipline its students for speech that may constitute
sexual harassment is also circumscribed by the First Amendment.").
3 See Investigative Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. at 11,448 n. 1 ("This investigative guidance
is directed at conduct that constitutes race discrimination under title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and not at the content of speech. In cases in which verbal statements or other
forms of expression are involved, consideration will be given to any implications of the
First Amendment.... ."); id. at 11,450 n.7 ("Of course, OCR cannot endorse or prescribe
speech or conduct codes or other campus policies to the extent that they violate the First
Amendment .... ."); Sexual Harassment Guidance, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,045 ("In cases of
alleged harassment, the protections of the First Amendment must be considered if issues of
speech or expression are involved."). Needless to say, the U.S. Department of Education's
Office for Civil Rights may limit the extent to which it regulates speech activities as a
matter of administrative discretion even if it is not constitutionally mandated to do so.
31 In several of his works, Frederick Schauer usefully distinguishes between "coverage,"
the threshold inquiry as to whether heightened scrutiny applies, and "protection," the
subsequent inquiry as to whether that scrutiny is satisfied. See, e.g., Schauer, Speech-ing,
supra note 13, at 361 n.6.
36 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 11, at 175-76.
31 See GARY A. TOBIN ETAL., THE UNCIVIL UNIVERSITY 44-53 (2005) (noting the misuse
of First Amendment arguments in academic settings); Marcus, supra note 14, at 888; Ruth
Contreras et al., Position Paper on Anti-Semitism in Academia, SCHOLARS FOR PEACE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST, Mar. 20, 2003, http://www.spme.net/cgi-bin/ articles.cgi?ID=32. The
contemporary debate about campus anti-Semitism is different in several respects from other
forms of harassment, which make it a most difficult case for civil rights advocates. First,
much contemporary or "new" anti-Semitism includes (or mimics) the tropes of political
discourse. To the extent that hostile environments are created in part by putatively political
discourse, the spoken elements of the harassment are more closely connected to core First
Amendment concerns than is the case with more familiar hate speech. Second, some
commentators argue that much alleged anti-Semitism is not in fact anti-Semitic. See, e.g.,
1032 [Vol. 16:1025
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I. FIRST AMENDMENT OPPORTUNISM
A. The Nature of First Amendment Opportunism
In one classic article, Frederick Schauer famously identified the phenomenon
of "First Amendment opportunism" as the use of First Amendment argumentation
as a second-best justificatory device when the primary justification for a questioned
course of conduct is legally unavailable. In other words, it is the opportunistic use
of free speech doctrines by people and organizations who find that they lack other
rhetorically or doctrinally effective means of achieving their goals. 39 In a useful
metaphor, Professor Schauer likens First Amendment opportunism to the use of a
pipe wrench to drive a nail into a board when one does not have a hammer.' ° It is
a second-best device pressed into service for tasks to which it is poorly designed.4'
Parties resort to the First Amendment in this way, and with considerable frequency,
when "society has not given them the doctrinally or rhetorically effective argumen-
tative tools they need to advance their goals. 42 By way of example, Schauer points
to First Amendment arguments regarding false or aggressive advertising, nude
dancing, and gays in the military (think "Don't Ask, Don't Tell").43 In each case,
the First Amendment becomes the "pipe wrench" of legal and political argument in
American culture, playing the role of "argumentative showstopper" that sacred text
or abstract principles serve in others.44 In this way, Schauer argues, "political,
social, cultural, ideological, economic, and moral claims. . . that appear to have no
special philosophical or historical affinity with the First Amendment, find
themselves transmogrified into First Amendment arguments.4
Michael Neumann, What Is Anti-Semitism?, in THE PoLrrIcs OF ANTI-SEMrISM 1-12
(Alexander Cockburn & Jeffrey St. Clair eds., 2003). They may argue, for instance, that
some alleged anti-Semitic incidents consist merely of legitimate criticism of the State of
Israel, Israeli policies, or the policies of the United States or other countries toward Israel.
See id. Third, others who do not deny this form of anti-Semitism nevertheless "banalize"
or minimize it, especially in those areas where people have become inured and desensitized
to anti-Semitic incidents as they have increased in volume and severity. See PIERRE-ANDRE
TAGUIEFF, RISING FROM THE MUCK: THE NEW ANTI-SEMmsM IN EUROPE 3 (Patrick
Camiller trans., 2004) ("[M]any different attitudes and manifestations of Judeophobia had
become banalized, as if they fitted so well into the ideological scenery that they were no
longer perceptible.").
31 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 11, at 175-97.
'9 Id. at 175.
40 Id.
41 id.
42 Id.
41 Id. at 177-87.
44 Id. at 176.
41 Id. at 191.
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The phenomenon is notable because there may be no neutral principles to
determine what conduct is First Amendment speech and what conduct is not.'
Some speech is not covered under the First Amendment and some non-speech conduct
is covered.47 Examples of speech not covered under the First Amendment include
contractual terms, warranties, wills, product labels, securities representations, and
certain competitive price information." Conversely, examples of non-speech that
is covered under the First Amendment include dancing, mime, music, parades,
armband protests, and flag-waving.49 The issue here is not whether the conduct is
protected under the First Amendment but whether it is even covered. In other words,
some forms of speech and conduct have historically been considered outside the
ambit of First Amendment concern. Schauer has therefore identified as a principle
feature of First Amendment jurisprudence that the initial inquiry of whether the
Amendment's rules, standards, tests, and factors apply is quite distinct from the later
inquiry of whether the conduct at issue is what one might in ordinary parlance de-
scribe as "speech., 50 First Amendment opportunism consists of efforts to apply First
Amendment principles outside of the context in which they have historically been
applied in the service of goals that otherwise lack stronger justificatory support."'
B. Harassment and First Amendment Opportunism
The most difficult example of First Amendment opportunism-and the only one
to which Schauer has devoted an entire article-is the way in which opponents of
harassment sanctions have transformed harassment into a free-speech issue.52 Given
the enormous volume of commentary on this issue over the last two decades, it is
surprising to realize that harassing speech has only relatively recently been seen as
First Amendment speech.53 During the early years of the development of harassment
46 See Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 5, at 1803 (discussing how First Amendment
coverage principles are speculative).
"' Schauer, Speech-ing, supra note 13, at 349. Schauer demonstrates that non-covered
speech is not limited, for example, to performative speech and that even some forms of
advocacy speech are also not covered. Id. at 349-50.
48 Id. at 349-50.
49 Id. Indeed, the list is rather long. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310
(1990) (holding that the Flag Protection Act of 1989 was unconstitutional); Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989) (finding the burning of an American flag during a political protest to
be protected by the First Amendment); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288 (1984) (finding that a regulation prohibiting demonstrators from sleeping in a park did
not violate the First Amendment); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding
a ban on the burning of draft cards).
'0 Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 5, at 1765-68; Schauer, Speech-ing, supra note 13,
at 350.
51 See Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 11, at 175-76.
52 Schauer, Speech-ing, supra note 13, passim.
51 The courts have on various occasions, if not consistently, protected the right of hateful
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law, the use of words in the act of harassment, with few exceptions, no more
implicated the First Amendment than did the use of words in "virtually every act of
unlawful price-fixing, unlawful gambling, or unlawful securities fraud."54 Only a
decade ago, the literature on this topic was charged with a "palpable absence" of
engagement with First Amendment values.55 This is a significant change in that
sexual harassment law was not subject to constitutional review during the earlier
formative years of its development.56 In other words, it was not very long ago that
the entire debate over First Amendment protection in this area was not even a part
of First Amendment discourse.57 Shifting the terms of debate from harassment to the
First Amendment has been an effective strategy for those who recognize that the First
Amendment has significant rhetorical cachet and may trump other social values.5 8 In
other words, it has been an effective form of First Amendment opportunism.
Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether the Supreme Court would extend the
boundaries of the First Amendment in this manner. Despite the frequency with which
commentators now discuss the conflict between sexual harassment law and the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue, and it has seldom
been resolved even by the lower courts. Some commentators have argued that the
Supreme Court does not consider sexual harassment to be within the coverage of the
First Amendment, noting that the Court did not address the issue when it was squarely
raised before it.59 Specifically, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the Court silently
passed over First Amendment defenses to a hostile environment sexual harassment
case in which much of the offending conduct was verbal.' Professor Schauer has
argued that the Court's silent avoidance of the First Amendment argument may be
groups to express their views publicly. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380,
393-96 (1992) (finding a First Amendment violation when a city ordinance banned certain
types of "reprehensible" conduct); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 916 (1978) (permitting a neo-Nazi march through a Jewish neighborhood in Skokie,
Illinois). But see Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003) (permitting a Virginia statute
banning cross burnings).
4 Schauer, Speech-ing, supra note 13, at 347.
5 See Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 267, 278 (1991).
56 Post, supra note 13, at 383; Schauer, Speech-ing, supra note 13, at 347.
17 For influential arguments on a hate-speech exception to free speech, see Lawrence,
supra note 26, at 461; Matsuda, supra note 26, at 2356-58. This exception would be analogous
to the fighting words doctrine, which permits government regulation of messages that have
"such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
58 Schauer, Speech-ing, supra note 13, at 355 (attributing this insight to Judith Resnik).
" Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment
Dog that Didn't Bark, 1994 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 1-2.
60 510 U.S. 17, 19,21-23 (1993) (describing verbal conflict and refraining from addressing
any possible First Amendment arguments in the Court's holding).
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seen as a decisive rejection of the relevance-which is to say the coverage--of
First Amendment claims in this context, precisely because those issues were not
even addressed.6'
Of course, even if sexual harassment claims in the workplace are not covered
under the First Amendment (and a full discussion of this claim is beyond the scope
of this Article), one might still argue that harassment claims are covered in higher
education. Depending on the rationale for finding harassment is not covered in the
workplace, it is at least arguable that the privileged status of free speech in academia
requires a greater range of coverage in that area.62 This might, for instance, be the
conclusion which one reaches through an institutional approach to First Amendment
coverage.63 Certainly, higher education is frequently thought to be a forum in which
First Amendment concerns have a heightened importance,' because the "classroom
is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas."'6" The Supreme Court has long since held
"that state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the
First Amendment." 66
On the orther hand, even undcr an irstizUtion0d analysis, the argument could go the
other way. For instance, one could argue that students' interest in equal educational
opportunities, not only in the public schools, but also in higher education, is of such
central constitutional import as to trump the institution's speech values.67 A third
61 Schauer, Speech-ing, supra note 13, at 356.
62 Indeed, hostile environment claims more frequently provoke First Amendment arguments
at schools, colleges, and universities than elsewhere. Id. at 354.
63 Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?, 77 U. CoLo. L. REV. 907,
919-26 (2006) [hereinafter Schauer, Academic Freedom]; Frederick Schauer, Towards an
Institutional First Amendment, 89 MiNN. L. REv. 1256, 1274-75 (2005). An earlier
formulation of this general argument can be found in J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A
"Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251,256 (1989). For a critique of
the institutionalist approach toward "carving up" the First Amendment, see Dale Carpenter,
Response, The Value of Institutions and the Values of Free Speech, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1407
(2005). Interestingly, Schauer has concluded:
[T]he right of academic freedom, as a component of the First
Amendment, may well be the right of a university-whether public or
private-to make its own academic decisions, even if those decisions
might, when made by a public college or university, constitute other-
wise constitutionally problematic content-based or even viewpoint-
based decisions.
Schauer, Academic Freedom, supra at 923-24.
64 Schauer, Speech-ing, supra note 13, at 354.
65 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
66 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
67 On the constitutional importance of equal educational opportunity, see Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (upholding the power of Congress to enact legislation
advancing this value); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (establishing the high
importance of equal educational opportunity under our Constitution). Moreover, Man Matsuda
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position, recognizing that college campuses have attributes of both public fora and
private homes, would be to provide heightened protections only in public campus
spaces like lecture halls and not in residential areas.68 This micro-institutional
approach may be unworkable in practice to the extent that it requires a case-by-case
consideration of a multiplicity of environments.
The institutional approach has its drawbacks, many of which are rooted in basic
rule-of-law concerns. Carving up First Amendment coverage by institution requires
the courts to make complicated, policy-laden, high-stakes, institution-by-institution
determinations. In the meantime, legal uncertainty may foment excessive litigation
and, worse, chill the exercise of legitimate, protected speech. Furthermore, it raises
the prospect that the courts will privilege certain speakers based on institutional
biases (including biases toward institutions with which judges have had personal
associations). Even if their institutional determinations are free of bias, they may
have the actual or perceived effect of providing unequal protection of laws (as when
university professors appear to receive greater constitutional protections than those
permitted to lesser mortals: quod licetjovi non licet bovi).69
II. CAMPUS ANTI-SEMITISM AS FIRST AMENDMENT OPPORTUNISM
The literature on campus anti-Semitism, and of the "new" anti-Semitism
generally, is conspicuous for the prominence with which freedom of speech claims
are raised, not only in the United States,70 but also in countries which have weaker
speech protections and stronger hate speech laws.7' Some campus hate incidents
do not pose even remotely plausible First Amendment concerns;7 2 rather, they in-
volve vandalism, 73 rock-throwing,74 stalking,75 death threats,76 arson,7 7 and physical
argued that college students are at a particularly "vulnerable stage of psychological development"
and especially subject to the harm of hateful speech. Matsuda, supra note 26, at 2370.
68 Strossen, supra note 25, at 503-04.
69 "[W]hat is permitted to Jove (or Jupiter, the king of the gods) is not permitted to cows."
Danny J. Boggs, Challenges to the Rule of Law: Or, Quod Licet Jovi Non Licet Bovi,
2006-2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 7.
70 See TOBIN ET AL., supra note 37, at 44-53; Marcus, supra note 14, at 888; Contreras,
supra note 37.
71 For a discussion of this issue in the Canadian context, see Dr. Stefan Braun, Second-
Class Citizens: Jews, Freedom of Speech, and Intolerance on Canadian University Campuses,
WASH. & LEE J. CIvIL RTs. & SOC. JUST., Spring 2006, at 1, 27.
72 See Marcus, supra note 14, at 890-91.
71 Id. at 854, 890 n.320.
74 Tuchman, supra note 14, at 17.
71 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
76 See Marcus, supra note 14, at 850-51, 853-54; Tuchman, supra note 14, at 17; Dr.
Laurie Zoloth, Fear and Loathing at San Francisco State, in THOSE WHO FORGET THE PAST:
THE QUESTION OF ANTI-SEMIsM (Ron Rosenbaum ed., 2004).
77 Tuchman, supra note 14, at 13-14; see also Kim Vo, Ceremonial Shelter Burns, Ends
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intimidation.78 Other incidents, however, involve harassing incidents and the use of
words.79 Whether the First Amendment is appropriately raised in these cases is now
a topic of considerable controversy. To understand how this is so, and to understand
the competing narratives at stake, requires some understanding of the development
of contemporary campus anti-Semitism.
A. The Resurgence of Campus Anti-Semitism
During recent years, American college campuses have seen numerous alarming
examples8° of the striking resurgence of anti-Semitic activity which is taking place
worldwide.8 There appear to be six sources for this resurgence: traditional Euro-
pean, Christian Jew-hatred; aggressive anti-Israelism that crosses the line into anti-
Semitism; traditional Muslim anti-Semitism; anti-Americanism and anti-globalism
that spill over into anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism; black anti-Semitism; and
Jewrh,,zt .o:Fe t....'SAN JOSE MERCUtKY NEws, Oct. 5, 2007. In 2007, a Jewish ceremonial
structure was torched at San Jose State University, although police have not yet determined
the cause. Id. Another similar structure was defaced at the University of California at Davis
that same week. Richard Proctor, Jewish Religious Booth Vandalized, THE CALIFORNIA AGGIE,
Oct. 5, 2007, available at http://www.californiaaggie.com/home/index.cfm?eent=display
Article&ustory-id=918d&dcc-b3c2-4e38-8806-717595d2a4f2.
7' For a detailed description of one such episode, see Zoloth, supra note 76, at 258-61.
79 The words are often quite choice. For example, University of California at Irvine
audiences have been informed that "there are good Jews and bad Jews" and have been taught
the "Jewish cracker theory," according to which "Jews are plagued with arrogance that
comes from a combination of white supremacy and the notion that Jews are the chosen
people." Tuchman, supra note 14, at 15.
80 See CAMPuS ANTI-SEMITISM, supra note 6; TOBIN ET AL., supra note 37; Kenneth L.
Marcus, The Resurgence of Anti-Semitism on American College Campuses, 26 CURRENT
PSYCHOL. 206 (2007); Marcus, supra note 14, at 840-44.
"' Many organizations have concluded that anti-Semitic activity has increased. See, e.g.,
PHYLLIS CHESLER, THE NEW ANTI-SEMITISM: THE CURRENT CRISIS AND WHAT WE MUST
Do ABOUT IT (2003); ABRAHAM FOXMAN, NEVER AGAIN? THE THREAT OF THE NEW ANTI-
SEMITISM (2003); GABRIEL SCHOENFELD, THE RETURN OF ANTI-SEMITISM (2004); Braun,
supra note 71; ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP AGAINST ANTISEMITISM, REPORT OF THE
ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY INTO ANTISEMITISM (2006), available at http://
thepcaa.org/Report.pdf; EUROPEAN JEWISH CONGRESS, ANTI-SEMITIC INCIDENTS AND
DISCOURSE IN EUROPE DURING THE IsRAEL-HEZBOLLAH WAR (2006); MICHAEL
MCCLINTOCK & JUDITH SUNDERLAND, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ANTISEMITISM IN EUROPE:
CHALLENGING OFFICIAL INDIFFERENCE (2004), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst
.org/discriminationantisemitismantisemitism-report_22_april_2004.pdf. To put the new
anti-Semitism debate into perspective, compare Leon Wieseltier, Against Ethnic Panic:
Hitler Is Dead, in THOSE WHO FORGET THE PAST, supra note 76, at 178-88 (arguing that the
fervor over perceived anti-Semitic actions is largely based on unfounded hysteria), with Ruth
R. Wisse, On Ignoring Anti-Semitism, in THOSE WHO FORGET THE PAST, supra note 76, at
189-207 (arguing that the threat against the Jewish people and Israel is real and imminent).
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fundamentalist intolerance.82 Generally speaking, the most significant recent episodes
of American campus anti-Semitism have been associated with anti-Israelism or anti-
Zionism. 83 In addition to the University of California at Irvine, a few other
campuses have become particularly notorious for alleged incidents of anti-Semitism
over the last few years."
San Francisco State: During one notorious 2002 rally, a large number of pro-
Palestinian students surrounded approximately fifty Jewish students, screaming
"Get out or we will kill you," and "Hitler did not finish the job."85 When one Jewish
professor began to sing peace songs, the crowd yelled, "Go back to Russia, Jew. 86
At about the same time, students distributed a flyer advertising a pro-Palestinian
rally which featured a picture of a dead baby with the words, "Canned Palestinian
Children Meat-Slaughtered According to Jewish Rites Under American License."87
More recently, a Jewish supporter of Israel alleged that he was, in separate incidents,
spat on and assaulted.88
Columbia University: Columbia faculty, especially in the Middle East and Asian
Languages and Cultures program, have been accused of intimidating and silencing
Jewish pro-Israel students.89 In one example, a professor allegedly privately told a
pro-Israel Jewish student, "You have no voice in this debate." 9 When she insisted
that she be allowed to express her opinion he disagreed, approaching very close to her
and saying, "See, you have green eyes... You're not a Semite .... I'm a Semite. I
have brown eyes. You have no claim to the land of Israel."9'
These incidents are quite distinct from legitimate criticizing of Israeli politics.92
To the extent that there might be any question, the distinguishing features of anti-
Semitic anti-Zionism are rapidly becoming conventional: employment of "classic
anti-Semitic stereotypes," use of double standards, "drawing comparisons between
Israel and Nazi Germany," and "holding Jews collectively responsible for Israeli
82 The first four forms of global anti-Semitism are identified in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
REPORT ON GLOBAL ANTI-SEMmsM (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
40258.htm. The latter two forms of indigenous anti-Semitism are identified in Marcus, supra
note 14, at 844.
83 Marcus, supra note 14, at 844.
For a more detailed discussion of incidents on these campuses, see id. at 850-56.
85 Zoloth, supra note 76, at 260.
86 Id. at 261.
87 Sarah Stem, Campus Anti-Semitism, in CAMPUS ANTI-SEMITISM, supra note 6, at 22.
88 This was reported to the author during an interview conducted at San Francisco State
University, Nov. 15, 2007.
89 The Anti-Defamation League, Public Comments, in CAMPUS ANTI-SEMITISM, supra
note 6, at 58-60; Stem, supra note 87, at 24-25. The Columbia situation is discussed
extensively throughout TOBIN ET AL., supra note 37, at 158-60.
9o Stem, supra note 87, at 24-25.
91 Id.
92 Findings and Recommendations, in CAMPUS ANTI-SEMITISM, supra note 6, at 72.
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actions" regardless of actual complicity.93 For example, American college students
and faculty have recently used the medieval phrase "blood libel" to describe Israeli
military practices, 94 ascribed traditional Jewish cultural stereotypes to contempo-
rary Israeli society,95 and attributed demonic characteristics to Israeli leaders and
Zionists as those characteristics have historically been related to Jews.96
This spillover of anti-Israelism into anti-Semitism has historical resonance in
that it represents the second significant mutation that anti-Semitism experienced in
the space of a century.97 Some of this activity, globally and domestically, takes the
form of basic hate and bias activity. Much recent anti-Semitism, however, is post-
racialist or even anti-racist in appearance. 98 While early nineteenth-century anti-
Semitism was predominantly religious in animus and mid-twentieth-century anti-
Semitism predominantly racial, twenty-first-century anti-Semitism is predominantly
political in character and often purports to address the Jewish state. 99
The nineteenth-century shift from religious to racialist anti-Semitism, attributed
largely to German journalist Wilhelm Marr and his colleagues, was essentially a
deliber.teeff... jaffify fo-tinued ad-eAe-cc iu anti-Jewish attitudes in the face
9' The increasingly conventional use of these criteria is discussed in Marcus, supra note
14, at 846-48, 851. For a few approaches to this issue which tend to converge upon the
criteria identified above, see, for example, Bernard Lewis, The New Anti-Semitism: First
Religion, Then Race, Then What?, 75 AM. SCHOLAR 25, 26-27 (2006); Natan Sharansky,
Seeing Anti-Semitism in 3D, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 24, 2004, available at http://www
.ncsj.org/AuxPages/022304JPostShar.shtml; Letters between Robert Wistrich, Dir., Vidal
Sassoon Int'l Ctr. for the Study of Anti-Semitism, Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, and Brian
Klug, Senior Research Fellow, Oxford Univ. (2005), available at http://sicsa.huji
.ac.il/klug.html; European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Working
Definition of Antisemitism (Mar. 16, 2005), http://eumc.europa.eu/eumc/material/pub/AS/
AS-WorkingDefinition-draft.pdf. Despite the apparent recent convergence of identified
criteria, these analyses are by no means uncontroversial and are rejected by commentators
who disagree, in varying degrees, with these analysts' conclusions regarding the relationship
between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism. See, e.g., NORMAN G. FINKELSTEIN, BEYOND
CHUTZPAH: ON THE MISUSE OF ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE ABUSE OF HISTORY (2005) (denying
the existence of a new anti-Semitism); THE POLrrIcS OF ANTI-SEMTISM, supra note 37, at
vii-viii (highlighting the plight of the Palestinian people that is often lost in the debate over
Israel); Brian Klug, The Myth of the New Anti-Semitism: Reflections on Anti-Semitism, Anti-
Zionism and the Importance of Making Distinctions, THE NATION, Feb. 2,2004, at 23 (argu-
ing that when anti-Semitism is seen everywhere, it loses its true significance).
9" Marcus, supra note 14, at 851 (describing the use at San Francisco State University of
the so-called "blood libel," a centuries-old defamation which ascribes a particular form of
cannibalism to persons of the Jewish faith).
9' Id. at 852-53 (relating allegations at Columbia University).
96 Id. at 854 (relating allegations at the University of California at Irvine).
97 See ROBERT S. WISTRICH, ANTISEMITISM: THE LONGEST HATRED xxiv (1991).
98 See WALTER LAQUEUR, THE CHANGING FACE OF ANTI-SEMrISM: FROM ANCIENT
TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY 147 (2006).
99 WISTRICH, supra note 97, at xxi-xxiii.
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of changing social attitudes towards religion and religious discrimination."
Significantly, the religious-racialist mutation served an evolutionary function: the
anti-Semitism virus evolved to adapt to changing environmental conditions. The
racialist-political mutation, in which racialist anti-Semitism evolved into political
anti-Semitism, represented a similar example of adaptive behavior in the twentieth
century: Jew-hatred adapted to a post-Holocaust environment in which explicit
race-hatred was socially unacceptable unless repackaged to appear political in
nature.'0' In many cases, age-old anti-Semitic stereotypes and defamations are recast
in contemporary political terms, castigating Israel and Zionism in terms historically
used to denigrate Jews and Judaism. 10 2 In this formulation, Israel-mordantly
characterized as "the 'Jew' of the nations'' a is made the repository of age-old
stereotypes and defamations classically equated with Jews: as "a pariah;" as "super-
naturally powerful and crafty;" as conspiratorial; and as a malignant force responsible
for the world's evils.' 4
This political turn in anti-Semitism has had another consequence however.
Where political speech has social and legal protection, such as on the American
college campus, politically inflected hate and bias incidents are more difficult to
police without implicating constitutional protections and academic freedom
concerns. 05 Indeed, virtually any form of abuse may be considered protected-and
its opposition deemed censorious-when the context is an academic campus and the
'0' LAQUEUR, supra note 98, at 21-22; WISTRICH, supra note 97, at xv.
o' Lewis, supra note 93, at 25-29; Kenneth L. Marcus, The Second Mutation: Israel and
PoliticalAnti-Semitism, inFOCUS, Spring 2008, at 2, available athttp://www.jewishpolicycenter
.org/infocus/.
,02 Findings and Recommendations, in CAMPUS ANTI-SEMrISM, supra note 6, at 72
(finding that "[a]nti-Semitic bigotry" in higher education "is no less morally deplorable
when camouflaged as anti-Israelism or anti-Zionism"); Marcus, supra note 14, at 844-46.
103 SCHOENFELD, supra note 81, at 147.
"4 Id. Since the end of World War II, explicit racialist anti-Semitism has been
unfashionable in most Western countries. Lewis, supra note 93, at 29. For this reason,
animosity towards Jews and Judaism in the postwar period has been expressed primarily in
political rather than racial terms. Id. This development likely occurred first in the Soviet
Union, where Jews were frequently persecuted as "Zionists" by Stalin and his successors.
LAQUEUR, supra note 98, at 180. As Walter Laqueur has explained, this use of the term
"Zionism" was purely euphemistic or pretextual, since virtually all true Russian Zionists had
emigrated to Palestine by the end of the war. Id. This mutation in the rhetoric of anti-
Semitism mirrors the parallel transition in nineteenth-century Germany, where racialist anti-
Semitism developed as a self-conscious alternative to the purely religious Judaeophobic
antipathies which were already considered backward. Marcus, supra note 101. For a
discussion of this earlier transition, see WISTRICH, supra note 97, at xv.
"'0 For a discussion of the balance between freedom of speech and respect for a campus
community, see J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79
GEO. L.J. 399 (1991).
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perpetrator is careful to adopt the tropes of political discourse."° This has been an
enormous challenge for civil rights enforcement in this area.
B. The Harassment Narrative: The Harm in Campus Anti-Semitism
As with other cases of racial antagonism, these incidents may be characterized
as basic harassment, implicating core equal protection concerns.1 °7 As Richard
Delgado has written, those who frame questions of ethno-racial insult in Equal Pro-
tection Clause terms "will ask whether an educational institution does not have the
power, to protect core values emanating from the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, to enact reasonable regulations aimed at assuring equal personhood on
campus."'08 In this case, it must be remembered, the regulations in question are not
speech codes but harassment policies.' 9 That is to say, their aim is not to restrict any
form of speech per se, as is the case with speech codes; rather, it is to eliminate those
forms of discrimination that deny students an equal educational opportunity based on
prohibited classifications, regardless of whether the discriminatory conduct includes
the use of words. As such, they are mandated by long-standing federal regulations
promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 '-a statutory provision
which, notwithstanding its Spending Clause justification, was passed in order to
effectuate the Fourteenth Amendment and arguably also the Thirteenth."'
106 Id.
107 CAMPUS ANrI-SEMmIsM, supra note 6, at 3 (discussing statutory-based concerns); Marcus,
supra note 14, at 868-74 (discussing Fourteenth Amendment concerns and statutory concerns).
108 Delgado, supra note 26, at 346 (footnote omitted).
10 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in federally assisted
programs, including public and private universities, on the basis of race, color, or national
origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2000). The Supreme Court established two decades ago, in the
context of sexual harassment, that unwanted talk, teasing, or touching may violate federal
law. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (determining that a bank em-
ployee may sue because of unwanted sexual advances, even if she did not lose her job). In
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, the Supreme Court held that sexual harassment
against students in educational settings constituted sex discrimination. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
Having established a private right of action for sexual harassment under Title IX in Franklin,
the Court in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District prescribed the circumstances
under which a school district may be held liable for teacher-on-student sexual harassment.
524 U.S. 274, 284-85 (1998). A year after Gebser, the Supreme Court held in Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education that student-on-student harassment may also violate
Title IX. 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). In Davis, however, the Court limited the liability of
school districts to instances in which they act with deliberate indifference to the harassment
and where the harassment is "so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive," that it
"undermines and detracts from the victims' educational experience" to the point at which
"victim-students are effectively denied equal access to an institution's resources and
opportunities." Id. at 651.
110 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d).
.I Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 286 (1978).
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Certain consequences follow from the characterization of this issue in terms of
harassment, as Professor Delgado has observed. First, the defenders of this harassment
must now show that the interest in the protection of their actions or speech is
sufficiently compelling to overcome the antidiscrimination principle and that, if so, it
is advanced in the least discriminatory manner."2 In other words, must institutions be
permitted to cultivate environments so hostile as to deny students equal educational
opportunity? Is there not a way to allow legitimate campus discourse without
eliminating equal access? Second, advocates may insist that the enforcement be
sensitive to the nuances of harassment and equal opportunity at issue."3 In this case,
for example, enforcement officials would need to understand the nature of the new anti-
Semitism and the way in which it impacts American college students who are targeted.
Third, a certain set of slippery slopes will come into view.' 14 If verbal harassment is
permitted, then why not non-verbal harassment which conveys expressive content? If
campuses are permitted to develop environments that are hostile to Jews, then why not
to women and other minorities? If harassment is constitutionally protected, then why
not other forms of discrimination which also communicate messages about racial (or
other) superiority, whether their means are verbal or non-verbal?
From the perspective of antidiscrimination law, the question here is not whether
anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism, has become anti-Semitism, crosses over into anti-
Semitism, or is a veil for anti-Semitism." 5 Rather, the question is whether specific
incidents create a sufficiently hostile environment for Jewish students to deny them
equal educational opportunities." 6 Parsing the matter in this way shows how high
the bar is, and it also focuses us on what the stakes are. Moreover, it forces us to
address, in the context of contemporary anti-Semitism, the question that feminists
were forced to address a generation ago with respect to sexual harassment: What
is the harm in this form of harassment?" 7 How, palpably, does anti-Zionism deprive
individual American students of educational opportunities when exposure to con-
trary views is such a vital element of the educational process?" 
8
1i2 Delgado, supra note 26, at 346.
"1 Id. at 346.
"' Delgado, supra note 26, at 346.
"s For a discussion of these related theories, see Marcus, supra note 14, at 845-46.
116 It should also go without saying that the anti-Zionism with which we are dealing here,
and which is found on many contemporary college campuses, is distinct from the various
historical Jewish arguments against Zionism, such as the messianic arguments associated
with some sects of Hasidic Jewry. For a brief description of such arguments, see Ari L.
Goldman, Hasidic Enclave: A Step Back to Older Values, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1986, at B1.
"17 For a demonstration of why it is important to understand the harm entailed by various
forms of harassment, see Katharine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49
STAN. L. REv. 691, 693 (1997).
118 The question is not an easy one even for those expert in the field. Indeed, one leading
commentator recently published an analysis of the effects of anti-Zionism on Jews which
does not even mention its impact on diasporic Jews. RuTH R. WISSE, JEWS AND POWER
142-54 (2007).
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Leon Wieseltier has called anti-Zionism "the most dangerous anti-Semitism of
them all."" 9 He reasons that "every instance of anti-Semitism is a criticism of the
Jewish state, a fundamental criticism, since it denies the legitimacy of the ideal of
a normal life for Jews."' 120 Similarly, Ruth Wisse has argued that Judaism without
Zionism would not be Judaism, "just as a non-Jewish Israel would not be Israel."' 12
In other words, anti-Zionism targets a central aspect of Jewish identity. In this
sense, an anti-Zionist who claims not to be anti-Semitic may be compared to an anti-
papist who claims not to be anti-Catholic; the claim, if not logically incoherent, will
unavoidably raise suspicion. Moreover, anti-Zionism typically also employs
classically anti-Semitic stereotypes and defamations in service of anti-Israeli
criticism.122 Pierre-Andre Taguieff has identified the essence of anti-Semitic anti-
Zionism with unusual precision:
By presenting "Zionism" as the incarnation of absolute evil, an
anti-Jewish vision of the world reconstituted itself in the second
half of the twentieth century. Like the old "anti-Semitism," in
the strong sense of the term, it is characterized by an absolute
hatred of Jews as representatives of a single, intrinsically
negative entity or exemplars of an evil force-that is, a total
hatred in which Jews are "considered in themselves as endowed
with a malign essence." Two ideas are regularly combined: the
Jews are everywhere ("nomadism"), and everywhere they
support one another (perhaps forming a worldwide group of
conspirators). The charge that Jews have a will to dominate, or
are involved in a "plot to conquer the world," is recycled in this
fantasy, as is the long-stereotypical rumble of accusation: "The
Jews are guilty," which for more than half a century has been
repeatedly translated into "the Zionists are guilty," "Zionism is
guilty," or "Israel is guilty."'23
Again in Wisse's terms, "contemporary anti-Zionism has absorbed all the stereo-
types and foundational texts of fascist and Soviet anti-Semitism and applied them
to the Middle East."' 24 Contemporary anti-Zionism, then, is an attack on a central
"' Leon Wieseltier, Old Demons, New Debates, in OLD DEMONS, NEW DEBATES: ANTI-
SEMITISM IN THE WEST 2 (David I. Kertzer ed., 2005).
120 Id.
121 Hillel Halkin, Zionism andAnti-Semitism, in OD DEMONS, NEW DEBATES, supra note
119, at 40.
122 TAGUIEFF, supra note 37, at 4.
123 Id. (citations omitted).
'24 Wisse, supra note 81, at 192.
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tenet of Judaism which is rooted in traditional anti-Semitism. To distinguish Jew-
hatred from hateful anti-Zionism is to misunderstand both concepts. Neither exists
without the other.
This is manifest in practice on those campuses where intensely hateful anti-
Zionism has adversely impacted Jewish students in very specific ways. On some
university campuses, Jewish students have been so harassed by anti-Zionist and
other anti-Semitic harassment that they have avoided wearing clothing or jewelry
that would identify them as Jewish; have deliberately refrained from speaking out
about Israel or Zionism for fear of retaliation; have avoided campus areas where
anti-Zionist or anti-Semitic activity is expected; and, in extreme cases, have trans-
ferred out of problematic campuses, fleeing anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism in
search of educational opportunities where they need not fear such harassment.'25
The contention here is not that anti-Zionist speech is harassment per se, but that
it may be used in a manner that contributes to the creation of a hostile environment.
In a sense, any word or deed can contribute to a hostile environment if it contributes
to denying particular students an equal educational opportunity. Certain forms of
anti-Zionism are simply more likely to have a harassing effect on Jewish students,
just as some forms of pornography may contribute to the development of an
environment which is hostile towards women.' 26 In both cases, the softer forms of
each mode of expression are unquestionably protected by the Constitution; 27
nevertheless, each genre includes examples which devalue their subject in a manner
which renders them more likely to have a harassing effect when used in a particular
manner. In other words, some anti-Zionism has characteristics which will fore-
seeably have this affect on reasonable university students: they are anti-Semitic in
the sense that they exhibit the characteristics which conventionally distinguish anti-
Semitism from legitimate criticism of Israel, and they are used as an assault upon
Jewish students individually and as a whole.
C. The First Amendment Narrative
Nevertheless, other commentators see harassing behavior as protected expression
when a hostile environment is created at least in part through the use of insulting
words or other expressive activities."' Given the high value traditionally associated
125 Marcus, supra note 14, at 854-55; Tuchman, supra note 14, at 15; ZOA, supra note
15, at4.
126 See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (holding that posting of photos of nude women in workplace was part of conduct
supporting a finding of hostile work environment).
127 See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (holding that defendant's conviction
for possessing and exhibiting an obscene film violated the First Amendment).
128 See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of
Social Science Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273, 328 n.369 (2001).
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with free inquiry and expression in academic settings, some civil libertarians ad-
vocate wide latitude for campus speech. 29 Granted, many civil libertarians acknow-
ledge that harassment, at least in the case of person-to-person harassment, is an
excepted category of behavior, since the spoken element is merely incidental to what
is essentially a form of unlawful conduct. 30 Nevertheless, those who defend
harassing activities-whether as First Amendment purists or as persons of less pure
motivation-typically argue that the public expressive portion of harassing activity
is protected from content-based regulation. While this approach may provide
harassment defenders with useful legal and rhetorical devices, they are not entirely
well suited to the task. Moreover, the attempt to address only person-to-person but
not general public hostile environment harassment ironically leaves the most
dangerous forms of harassment unaddressed.
By shifting the debate from the hateful conduct to the question of free speech,
those who frame campus racial hate as a First Amendment problem enjoy certain
favorable consequences. Here again, Richard Delgado has aptly described the
consequences of this shift in perspective, as he notes, "the burden shifts to the
[antidiscrimination] side to show that the interest in protecting members of the
campus community from" harassment and denial of equal opportunity is sufficiently
compelling to "overcome the presumption" that free speech enjoys.'13 This burden
is made harder by what one might call the "jiu-jitsu argument": the observation that
antidiscrimination law, like hate speech restrictions, may be used to harm precisely
the groups they were intended to protect. 132 For example, a 1974 resolution adopted
by the British National Union of Students to prevent "openly racist and fascist
organizations" from speaking on college campuses was invoked against Israelis,
including Israel's ambassador to the United Kingdom, after the U.N. adopted its
notorious proclamation on Zionism as racism.133 Similarly, in her path-breaking
article on hate speech, Mari Matsuda notoriously characterizes Zionism as a "hard
case," asserting that only some forms of Zionist speech should be protected." 4
129 See, e.g., id.
30 See, e.g., Post, supra note 55, at 301-02.
131 Delgado, supra note 26, at 345. Indeed, many equal opportunity advocates will be too
quick to acknowledge the presumption even when it is not salient.
132 Henry Louis Gates, Jr., War of Words: Critical Race Theory and the FirstAmendment,
in HENRY LouIs GATES, JR. ET AL., SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE SPEECH,
CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 43-45 (1994).
133 Id. at 44. Numerous other examples could be recounted. "During the year in which [the
University of] Michigan's speech code was enforced, more than twenty blacks were
charged-by whites-with racist speech," while "not a single instance of white racist
speech" was punished. Id.
134 Matsuda, supra note 26, at 2364. For example, she argues that Zionists who participate
in white supremacy should not be protected. Id. The problem with Matsuda's example is not
reciprocity. Certainly minority students (including Jews) who harass others should be held
to the same standards which protect their own equal opportunity. Rather, the problem with
her example is the suggestion that Zionism is related in some fashion to white supremacy.
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Moreover, Matsuda suggests that Palestinians should decide which Zionist speech
is protected and which is not. 3 In the end, however, the jiu-jitsu argument proves
too much, insofar as it provides a reason to oppose any legal tool worth having. The
fact that civil rights laws can be misused is an argument for better enforcement and
oversight, not an argument for abolition.
Second, once the First Amendment's doctrinal structure is adopted, "there must
be no less onerous way of accomplishing [the equal opportunity] objective." 13 6 For
example, it may be asked, could reasonable Jewish (or other minority) students
avoid the prospect of harassment or racial insult simply by avoiding courses,
conversations, or campus lectures in which they are likely to be offended? On one
campus, a senior administrator told me that Jewish students who are offended by
anti-Semitic lectures given on one part of campus could simply avoid that part of the
university. The administrator did not have an answer, however, when I asked which
portions of the university were equally available to all students regardless of religion
and whether there were certain portions that he would advise members of other
minority groups to avoid.
It is true that the Supreme Court has held that we bear the burden of averting our
attention from expressions that we find offensive in public places.'37 On the other
hand, college students, especially at residential, as opposed to commuter, institutions,
may be something of a "captive audience" for harassing behavior. Generally
speaking, the Court has been more protective of people's "captive audience" rights
in their own homes than in public places. 138 College campuses are both public
places and student homes-and, at various times and in various places, they bear
precisely the attributes that have led courts both to apply the First Amendment
strictly and to abstain from doing so.
There is an irony in the heightened concern typically given to the protection of
speeches at public events. On the one hand, even strong civil rights advocates have
sometimes shied away from criticizing Skokie-type hateful public expressions.
39
Their reason is that public discourse is both more central to the concerns of the First
Amendment and also less likely to yield significant individualized harms. At the
same time, some civil libertarians concede that there is "no clear boundary between
135 See id.
36 Delgado, supra note 26, at 345.
137 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (overturning a conviction for
wearing a jacket with explicit language).
138 See, e.g., Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (upholding
addressee's statutory right to have name removed from mailing list for erotic materials).
139 See Lawrence, supra note 26, at 457 & n.103. For the judicial opinions rejecting
arguments that the Jewish population of Skokie, Illinois, should be protected from an
American neo-Nazi group's demonstration, see Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205-07 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of Skokie v. Nat'l Socialist Party ofAm., 373
N.E.2d 21, 23-26 (Ill. 1978).
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speech that 'demonstrably hinders"' educational opportunities and speech that
merely "'creates an unpleasant learning' environment."' 4 If we are concerned about
hostile environments, though, we should be especially concerned about harassing
speech by public speakers at well-attended public events. Surely such events
contribute more to a campus environment than do person-to-person encounters.
Indeed, if one's goal were to create a hostile environment, one would want to focus
on such events. It is a great deal harder to change the environment of a large
institution through one-on-one retail encounters; in practical terms, environmental
changes are most efficiently conducted wholesale through large public events.
Indeed, the very term "hostile environment" encapsulates the insight that equal
opportunity is effectively denied by broad environmental conditions and not only
through direct person-to-person encounters.
Third, some will worry whether enforcement will amount to a slippery slope to
censorship, imposing intolerable restraints on campus discourse.' 4' This has been
the claim on many campuses at which anti-Semitic incidents have recently been
alleged. 142 In the University of California at Irvine case, for example, the adminis-
tration argues that the civil rights complainants are asking "that UC Irvine silence
just one side of the [campus Middle East] dialogue: the Muslim side."'43 Similarly,
an "Ad Hoc Committee to Defend the University" has circulated a petition, signed
by over 500 university professors and others, denouncing efforts to defame scholars
and pressure administrators.'" The petitioners argue that defenders of Israel are
threatening free speech, academic freedom, the norms of academic life, and "the
core mission of institutions of higher education in a democratic society."'45 Indeed,
the petitioners warn that these efforts pose a "serious threat to institutions of higher
education in the United States."'" The methods which the ad hoc committee
specifically decries include "unfounded" allegations of anti-Semitism, efforts to
broaden the definition of anti-Semitism, and certain lawsuits presumably brought
140 Strossen, supra note 25, at 499.
14" Delgado, supra note 26, at 345. As one commentator bluntly asserted, "Partisans of Israel
often make false accusations of anti-Semitism to silence Israel's critics." Scott Handleman,
Trivializing Jew-Hatred, in THE POLmcs OF ANTI-SEMITISM, supra note 37, at 13, 13.
142 See Contreras, supra note 37 (stating that many university officials believe anti-
Semitism is "protected as academic freedom").
143 CAMPUS ANTI-SEMrISM, supra note 6, at 65 (quoting UC Irvine counsel Diane Geocaris).
'44 Ad Hoc Committee to Defend the University, Petition, http://defend.university
.googlepages.com/home (last visited Apr. 8, 2008). Interestingly, the petition does not argue
that well-founded allegations of campus anti-Semitism threatened the freedom of speech,
only "unfounded insinuations and allegations." Id. It is not clear how the petitioners would
expect university administrators or civil rights officials to distinguish between well-founded
and unfounded allegations, other than by investigating them.
145 Id.
'w Id.
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under civil rights laws.' 47 In other words, the petitioners are broadly targeting a wide
range of efforts intended to protect Jewish university students from anti-Semitic
harassment. This sort of charge appears to have rhetorical traction with many people
and is sometimes combined with stereotypical assertions about Jewish conspiratorial
power and Jewish control over the media.4 Indeed, Stephen Walt and John
Mearsheimer recently called anti-Semitism allegations the "Great Silencer."' 49
Unavoidably, antidiscrimination law will have the effect of silencing some
discriminators, just as tort law silences some defrauders and conspiracy law silences
some conspirators. This will be true as long as lawbreakers use words to further
their malfeasance. The serious First Amendment question here is not whether any
speech is silenced, but whether legitimate, protected speech is chilled in a manner
that unacceptably hampers speech." 0
In fact, it may be argued that the failure to enforce antidiscrimination law may
have a more chilling effect on campus free expression than the exercise of this
power. Specifically, some commentators have observed that anti-Semitic incidents
have had the affect of silencing some Jewish students and faculty on college
campuses who were intimidated from expressing their viewpoint publicly.'5 ' In
reference to this problem, Natan Sharansky has dubbed American Jewish college
students the "new Jews of silence," a phrase resonant with the experience of Russian
Jews in the old Soviet Union. 5 2 Henry Louis Gates, Jr. has suggested that "perhaps
the most powerful arguments of all for the regulation of hate speech come from
those who maintain that such regulation will really enhance the diversity and range
of public discourse."' 153 The gist of this argument, as applied either to hate speech
or harassment, is that these activities tend to have a silencing effect on the minorities
at whom they are targeted. Indeed, the danger now is not only that students and
some faculty will be silenced by the harassment itself; it is also that they will be
silenced by other faculty members who denounce efforts to eliminate anti-Semitism
as a threat to academic freedom and "the core mission of institutions of higher
147 id.
"' BERNARD HARRISON, ISRAEL ANTI-SEMmSM AND FREE SPEECH 32 (2007).
"9 JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER & STEPHEN M. WALT, THE ISRAEL LOBBY AND U.S. FOREIGN
PoLICY 191-96 (2007). In light of the particular place which Professors Walt and
Mearsheimer occupy in this debate, the objectivity of their perspective may itself be subject
to question. Interestingly, this Great Silencer has not stilled Walt and Mearsheimer's presses,
nor hampered their international tour, nor quashed their audience before the United
Kingdom's House of Lords, nor prevented the reportedly healthy advances on sales of their
book. See, e.g., The Annotico Report, Oct. 3, 2007, http://www.annoticoreport.conV2007/
1 0/israel-lobby-to-be-translated-into.html.
S0 For a demonstration that, "[tihe charge of attempting to silence 'all critics of Israel' by
smearing them as anti-Semites is absurd," see HARRISON, supra note 148, at 35-37.
151 See, e.g., TOBIN ETAL., supra note 37, at 107.
152 Stem, supra note 87, at 22.
153 Gates, supra note 132, at 43-45.
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education in a democratic society."'" As I have traveled to college campuses to
describe the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights' public education campaign on
campus anti-Semitism, students and faculty have expressed precisely this concern
to me. That is, they are reluctant to speak out against hate and bias incidents for fear
that they will be accused of trying to silence debate or suppress academic freedom.
In the course of a powerful opposition to hate speech codes, Robert Post has
identified three distinct arguments to support this concept of silencing: "victim
groups are silenced because their perspectives are systematically excluded from the
dominant discourse; victim groups are silenced because the pervasive stigma of
racism systematically undermines and devalues their speech; and victim groups are
silenced because the visceral 'fear, rage, [and] shock' of racist speech systematically
preempts response."'55 Post's typology is useful insofar as it distinguishes between
three distinct modes of silencing: systematic exclusion, stigmatization, and
intimidation. Each of these methods may be used, consciously or unconsciously, to
stifle minority expression. The problem with Post's analysis is that it addresses only
the mildest version of each form of silencing, thereby failing to fully comprehend
the extent of the interest in protecting minority expression, particularly in matters
sufficiently serious to implicate the laws of harassment.
The first form of silencing-the systematic exclusion of minority perspectives from
the dominant discourse-when present, may be a strong argument for how minority
voices have been silenced. Post acknowledges that this argument may be factually true,
but he is able to avoid its ramifications by addressing minority exclusion at a highly
abstract level.156 For Post, the exclusion of minority perspectives may be a theoretical
claim about the way in which certain racialized or gendered understandings are built
into our language. Post refers, for instance, to built-in biases in discourse which
appears, facially, to be "neutral and objective. "157 Understandably enough, Post argues
that the function of dialogue is to question such apparently polite (mis)understandings,
challenging the tacit assumptions in public discourse."8 The exclusion of minority
perspectives can, however, be more blunt and literal, as when a senior professor directly
warns a Jewish, female student: "You have no voice in this debate.' ' 159 There is
" Ad Hoc Committee to Defend the University, supra note 144.
'5 Post, supra note 55, at 306 (citations omitted).
156 Id. at 306-07.
" Id. at 306 (citing Kimberd6 W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment. Transfor-
mation and Legitimation inAntidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1331, 1370-81 (1988)).
' Post, supra note 55, at 306-07.
119 TOBIN ETAL., supra note 37, at 107. This example is drawn from recent allegations at
Columbia University. Id. The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE) has
suggested that pro-Israeli or conservative scholars may find Columbia University to be
"inhospitable to their point of view," due in part to the dominance of anti-Zionist
perspectives at Columbia's MEALAC Department. Letter from David French, President
FIRE to Lee C. Bollinger, President, Columbia University (Jan. 10, 2005) at 6, available at
http://www.thefire.org/pdfs/5100_3550.pdf. Commenting on the situation at Columbia, FIRE
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nothing even facially "neutral and objective" about this silencing, which may have a
more direct chilling effect.
The second form of silencing, in Post's analysis, occurs when "victim groups
are silenced because the pervasive stigma of racism systematically undermines and
devalues their speech."'" Post acknowledges the factual premise of this argument
but responds that the problem can be resolved through better speech and more
effective political engagement.' Again, Post's argument is more persuasive when
the undermining and devaluing are gentle and polite than when stigmatization is
aggressive and blunt-as in the case, for example, of repeated calls to "slaughter the
Jews"-62-which, regardless of intent, has a potentially chilling effect which is
unlikely to be ameliorated by the best of contrary argument.
In the third form of silencing, the visceral "fear, rage, [and] shock" of racist
speech "systematically preempt[s] response."'' 63 This method, about which Post
expresses some skepticism, characterizes public discourse as coercive in the sense
that it documents the deep personal injury of racist speech." As this argument
goes, "this injury may in particular circumstances be so shocking as to literally
preempt responsive speech."'' 65 Indeed, this may be one reason for the selection of
certain hate tropes, such as the repeated use of Nazi references in anti-Jewish and
anti-Israeli speech. Post argues that, under these conditions, it is likely that
members of dominant and victim groups will develop conflicting judgments about
whether bigotry shocks significant numbers of the minority target group population
into silence.1 66 Moreover, Post argues that "[t]he visceral shock of uncivil speech
can sometimes actually serve constructive purposes, as when it causes individuals
to question the community standards ... and ... to acknowledge the claims of
others from radically different cultural backgrounds."' 67 This is surely not true of
admonishes that "it would violate every reasonable notion of student academic freedom to
give professors the ability to open classroom discussion for all comments except those
critical of the professor's point of view." Id. at 2."Just as students do not have the right to
'expect their views will be unchallenged,' neither do professors have the right to indoctrinate
their students without permitting a murmur of classroom dissent." Id. FIRE acknowledges
Columbia's right to maintain an anti-Zionist position within the Department if this advances
Columbia's mission. Id. at 5. However, FIRE urges Columbia to provide full disclosure to
students and donors if anti-Zionism is in fact central to the university's mission. Id.
Alternatively, if anti-Zionism is not central to Columbia's mission, FIRE urges Columbia to
provide for a more diverse expression of viewpoints on its campus. Id.
'6 Post, supra note 55, at 306.
161 Id. at 307.
162 See, e.g., Tuchman, supra note 14, at 17.
163 Post, supra note 55, at 306 (quoting Lawrence, supra note 26, at 452).
164 Id. at311.
165 Id. at 308.
166 Post, supra note 55, at 308.
161 Id. at 304.
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harassing speech which, to be actionable, must be so severe, persistent, and
objectively offensive as to prevent the target students from equally participating in
educational opportunities. 68 No one who hears persistent cries of "Hitler didn't
finish the job" or "let it snow with Jewish ash" will be inspired to question
community standards or to acknowledge the claims of the different backgrounds
which motivate the speakers.' 69
Finally, some will point to a different set of slippery slopes: "[11f a campus
restricts this type of expression, might the temptation arise to do the same with
classroom speech. . ."? 7 The answer here, of course, is yes. Students are no less
vulnerable to harassment in the classroom than elsewhere, and the importance of
academic freedom to the university does not provide faculty with carte blanche to
engage in any form of harassment as long as they do so within their own classrooms.
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that any conduct regulation broad enough
to encompass some amount of speech runs the risk of abuse. This is also true,
however, with respect to other areas, such as antitrust and securities regulation,
which lie outside the coverage of the First Amendment. 7'
D. Campus Anti-Semitism as First Amendment Opportunism
To characterize campus anti-Semitism as First Amendment opportunism is to
frame the issue in terms of an equal protection narrative. The gist of the former
characterization-and of the "opportunism" concept-is that the two narratives do
not provide equally suitable tools for the task.172 One of them is a hammer and the
other a pipe wrench, although both are whacking at the same nail.'73 On balance,
it appears that the First Amendment narrative is the pipe wrench here in the sense
that it is ill-equipped to address either person-to-person or general public hostile
environment harassment. It should be remembered, however, that to characterize
an argument as opportunistic is not to refute it, at least when "opportunism" is used
in Schauer's descriptive, non-pejorative sense. 17 Opportunism is the manner in
which non-covered activities may ultimately become covered. Whether the subject
of anti-Semitic harassment is likely to gain constitutional salience is a separate
question which will be discussed later. For present purposes, the important point is
merely that campus harassment-including even campus anti-Semitism-is a zone
of First Amendment opportunism.
168 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
169 See, e.g., Zoloth, supra note 76, at 260.
170 Delgado, supra note 26, at 345 (citations omitted).
'7 See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
172 See Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 11, at 175-76.
173 id.
174 Id. at 176.
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In what sense is the First Amendment narrative a pipe wrench when it comes to
anti-Semitic campus harassment? First, as Professor Schauer has demonstrated
more generally in the case of sexual harassment, the First Amendment frame was
not customarily applied to the harassment picture until relatively recently.'
Second, the pertinent area of state action (i.e., federal antidiscrimination law) does
not principally relate to speech, although its violation may be accomplished through
words. Third, the harm at issue (denial of equal educational opportunities) is not
primarily a function of speech. In these respects, efforts to apply the First
Amendment narrative to campus harassment may be considered opportunistic.
To describe a constitutional or rhetorical strategy as "opportunistic" is not to
assume that all who employ it are conscious of its opportunistic strategy. Indeed,
once a First Amendment strategy has been successfully utilized for a particular
purpose, it is unlikely that those who use it for that purpose in the future will be
aware of the irregularity in its usage. In other words, once the pipe wrench is
successfully used as a hammer, people will eventually forget that it was not forged
for that purpose, and the awkwardness of its use may be forgotten. However, if this
approach to harassment regulation is opportunistic, the question arises as to whether
the courts should accept the invitation to bring harassment regulation into the
boundaries of the First Amendment. This is a significant matter, since hostile
environment law, like securities and antitrust law, can be viewed as a form of
content-based speech regulation. If the courts should find that the First Amendment
is salient to this area of law, then one could of course argue as to whether particular
state actions are exempted under, say, the "fighting words" 176 or "imminent danger"
doctrines. 177 But to place harassment within the First Amendment narrative would
be to situate civil rights on a terrain decidedly to its disadvantage.
III. THE SALIENCE PROBLEM FOR CAMPUS HARASSMENT
For those who would defend campus hate speech, or any other opportunistically
defended misconduct, on First Amendment grounds, the most difficult hurdle may
be the threshold inquiry as to whether the subject is covered under the First
Amendment. The inquiry here is not the heavily debated question as to whether
First Amendment doctrine, if applied, would preclude regulation of the activities in
question. Rather, it is the prior inquiry as to whether First Amendment inquiry is
even salient to the question. This threshold inquiry is hampered by the lack of
71 See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
176 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (holding that the use of
"fighting words" is not protected by the First Amendment).
'7 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that a state cannot regulate
speech which advocates violence unless its advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
lawless action).
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standards. Frederick Schauer has argued that constitutional doctrine, which explains
what is protected under the First Amendment, does not determine the threshold
question of constitutional coverage. 7 ' Ultimately, the boundaries of the First
Amendment are determined by political, economic, social, and cultural forces more
so than by doctrinal theories.'79
Schauer has argued that the Supreme Court has silently disposed of First
Amendment arguments which it considers to be non-germane, rather than provide
a reasoned explanation or doctrinal support for their denial.' 8 This silence may be
the most devastating form of dismissal, but it could certainly be construed in other
ways. Arguably, this fade-to-black is the jurisprudential equivalent of the last ten
seconds of The Sopranos' series finale:' a pregnant gesture, endlessly debatable,
but inherently ambiguous.
Some possible gate-keeping standards, which Kent Greenawalt and Frederick
Schauer have culled from criminal law cases, include (i) whether the speech in
question is public or face-to-face, (ii) whether it is intended to provoke social change
rather than private gain, (iii) whether it relates to general issues rather than particular
transactions, and (iv) whether it is normative rather than informational.8 2 From this
one could induce that matters covered by the First Amendment tend to be general,
public, and socially motivated or directed. By contrast, those that are private, face-
to-face, and transactional tend not to be covered. By and large then, the First
Amendment tends to cover communications in the public sphere much more so than
the private sphere under this assessment.
Campus hate and bias incidents have fallen on both sides of this division. For
example, much political anti-Semitism has taken the form of venomous public anti-
Israeli speeches and lectures, which expressly advocate changes in American and
Israeli policy, relating to general matters of Middle Eastern politics, with intent to
communicate a perspective on social justice. Applying the Greenawalt-Schauer
factors, such speech would most likely be covered; moreover, once covered it would
undoubtedly be protected. By contrast, some campus anti-Semitism has taken
instead the form of ugly face-to-face confrontations with individual Jewish students
'78 Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 5, at 1766.
179 Id. at 1766-68.
180 Id. at 1796-97.
'' See HBO, The Sopranos Episode Guide, Season 6, Episode 86, http://www.hbo.com
sopranos/episode/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 2008) (describing the ending of the final
episode).
182 Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 5, at 1801, (citing KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH,
CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE (1989)). As Schauer demonstrates, however, no
doctrinal criteria adequately describe the boundaries of the First Amendment. Id. at 1803.
Some decisions can only be described by non-doctrinal criteria: sympathetic litigants, the
existence of a well-established regulatory scheme, and connections to issues already covered
under the First Amendment. Id. at 1803-07.
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or destruction of Jewish property, with no likelihood of affecting broader social
change other than by persecuting particular students based on the students' ethnic,
national, or religious traits with roughly the normative content of a swinging noose
or burning cross.183 The extent to which these incidents are covered by the First
Amendment is, at best, questionable.'8' Ironically, however, the conduct covered
under this dichotomy is in some ways less significant to the development of hostile
environment harassment than the conduct that would not be covered.
Even if the Greenawalt-Schauer factors were applied, moreover, the division of
hate and incidents into covered and non-covered categories is not as neat as it may
appear. First, these factors hardly describe the contours of First Amendment
coverage in a fully satisfactory manner. Schauer has argued that judicial coverage
determinations cannot be understood on the basis of doctrinal considerations alone
and that other factors must be appreciated, such as the presence of sympathetic
litigants, the connection to another activity covered under the First Amendment, or
the presence of a well-entrenched regulatory system. 185 Harassment, including
educational harassment, certainly satisfies the description of an activity subjected
to a well-established regulatory regime.
Second, the Greenawalt-Schauer factors more or less amount to a restatement
of the public/private dichotomy, 86 which has been so widely criticized both by
feminist and non-feminist political and legal theorists. 187 While characterizations
of this dichotomy vary, feminist critics often distinguish between a "public sphere"
which is regulated by law and a "private sphere" which is not. 88 Under one view,
the "private sphere," often associated with the family, is relatively unregulated by
government in a manner that parallels a laissez-faire approach to the economy.1
8 9
183 See, e.g., supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
'8 Compare Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (striking down a statute taking the
act of cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate, but affirming the state's
ability to criminalize cross-burning), with R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381
(1992) (invalidating an ordinance prohibiting display of symbols known to "arouse anger,
alarm or resentment in others").
185 Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 5, at 1803-07.
186 Others have observed the nexus between First Amendment law and the public/private
distinction. Indeed, one commentator has gone so far as to assert that "we have erected the
public-private dichotomy as the distinction around which all else in speech law revolves."
Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1192 (1993).
187 For a discussion of these critiques by a commentator sensitive to the manner in which
privacy concerns may be important to women, see Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the
Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992); see also Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving
the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847 (2000)
(reconsidering the feminist critique of the public/private dichotomy).
188 See, e.g., KATHERINE O'DONOVAN, SEXUAL DIVISIONS IN LAW 3 (1985).
189 See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1502 (1983).
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Feminist scholars have generally rejected a sharp dichotomy between "public" and
"private" as well as the view that the state should not regulate the "private
sphere."' ' Frances Olsen has argued, for example, that it is impossible for the state
to leave the family "free" through "neutral" nonintervention, since the state creates
the ground rules for social interaction within that sphere.' 9 '
In some ways, the Greenawalt-Schauer factors reflect the converse of the
dichotomy that feminist critics describe. In the First Amendment context, it is in the
"private sphere" that courts are more likely to allow speech regulation, while speech
in the "public sphere" is in theory unregulated. The First Amendment deregulation
of the public sphere is not inconsistent with the general understanding of the
public/private dichotomy. As Olsen points out, there are some public sphere
institutions-principally involving economic markets-for which laissez-faire
approaches were traditionally favored.'92 The "marketplace-of-ideas" metaphor
reflects the sense in which similar anti-regulatory impulses have traditionally been
advocated in different aspects of the public sphere.'93
What appears anomalous, however, is that the putative private sphere limitations
on First Amendment coverage suggest a greater constitutional tolerance of private
sphere regulation than public, notwithstanding the greater common law tolerance for
public sphere regulation in other areas. In this sense, we can inquire whether the
reverse of Olsen's critique applies here. The question becomes whether state actors
in higher education can ever be said to leave the public campus speech environment
free through "neutral" nonintervention when state institutions frame the terms of
discourse so pervasively in higher education: establishing programs, hiring faculty,
funding lectures, chartering student organizations, etc. When a state university
permits the creation of a hostile environment for certain students, can it really hide
from harassment claims behind the First Amendment when the university actively
controlled each of the elements which ultimately created the environment?
Third, the opportunistic character of at least some campus hate and bias
incidents prevents their facile characterization. In other words, it is the nature of
these gambits to present the private as public to invite constitutional coverage where
the First Amendment might otherwise not extend. For example, the opportunist
presents sexual abuse as public art by emphasizing the expressive character of
pornographic activities, rather than, for example, the personal character of the acts
that are portrayed. In the same way, the opportunist presents hate and bias incidents
as public by employing the paraphernalia of political discourse. This is most
apparent on those campuses where blatant, face-to-face intimidation and harassment
190 Suzanne A. Kim, Reconstructing Family Privacy, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 557, 570-71
(2006).
'9 Olsen, supra note 189, at 1509 n.53.
192 Id. at 1502.
'9' Id. at 1502-04.
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are ignored, while disputants endlessly debate the First Amendment ramifications
of hateful public speech. In each of these ways, opportunists manufacture the basis
for First Amendment coverage by repackaging essentially private conduct in a
manner that has the trappings of public discourse. The ease with which this tactic
is employed only reflects the frailty of the public/private distinction.
In short, we lack clear standards of First Amendment coverage, and the best
ones that we can glean are not entirely adequate to the task. It may be that other
criteria, whether as supplement or as alternative to the Greenawalt-Schauer factors,
may be in order. For all the shortcomings of the speech-conduct dichotomy, it
seems intuitive that some consideration must be given to the extent to which
expressive activity predominates in the regulated behavior; the extent to which
government action has the intent or effect of regulating the expressive character of
the behavior; and the extent to which the non-expressive content may be regulated
without implicating expression. Also relevant is the extent to which the conduct in
question falls within the ambit of competing constitutional concerns such as the
constitutional interest in equal protection.
Meanwhile, in the absence of acceptable standards, questions of salience must
be determined on a case-by-case basis. For example, is the First Amendment salient
to antidiscrimination law generally, to higher education harassment policy in
particular, and to the question of campus anti-Semitism? Notwithstanding the
difficulties inherent in the speech/conduct dichotomy, the Supreme Court has
suggested that some hateful expressions may be regulated on the basis of content if
the law that does so is based on conduct-as antidiscrimination law, unlike hate
codes, may be said to be.' 94 Ultimately, antidiscrimination law pulls in harassing
campus speech only as an incidental constituent of behavior addressed under a well-
established regulatory scheme.
What would it mean to say that it is not? Surely it does not mean that
antidiscrimination efforts will never run afoul of the First Amendment. Indeed,
Bivens liability has attached when government officials deliberately test the
boundaries of First Amendment protection by investigating to determine whether
purely political speech is motivated by discriminatory animus.195 Similarly, officials
may run afoul of constitutional protections if they seek to regulate campus speech
with overly vague speech guidelines.' 96 This is also true, however, of securities or
antitrust officials.'97 To say that a regulatory regime lies outside of the boundaries
of the First Amendment is not to give officials carte blanche to regulate all forms of
194 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992).
195 See, e.g., White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2000).
196 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 24, at 67-69.
197 SeeEastem R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961);
see also United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). Both cases suggested the
First Amendment protects lobbying the government to change federal antitrust laws.
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speech within its ambit. For example, while antitrust law generally resides outside
the boundaries of the First Amendment, it does fall within that amendment's
coverage at the margins, under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 98 To say that
harassment law is, as a general rule, no more covered by the First Amendment than
the law of securities, antitrust, or fraud is only to conclude that the incidental
regulation of speech in the course of a broader conduct-based regulatory scheme
does not, without more, satisfy the preliminary coverage inquiry.
CONCLUSION
Much of the rhetoric, and some of the legal argument, surrounding campus
harassment-and especially campus anti-Semitism---consists of First Amendment
opportunism. That is to say, it consists of agenda-driven efforts, varying in degree
of success, to change the topic from harassment to free speech in a context in which
the First Amendment is at least arguably inapplicable. These efforts are fraught with
social, legal, and political significance, as they mark a struggle to shift the
boundaries of constitutional discourse in a way that could increase some protections
while decreasing others.
The danger in this form of opportunism is generally two-fold. On one hand,
opportunistic use of the First Amendment can lead to distortion or dilution of the
protections afforded under that constitutional provision. This is a reflection of the
observation that "[tlhe First Amendment has always derived much of its strength
from its narrowness";' 99 in other words, it is able to provide strong protections to
those areas within its coverage precisely because its boundaries are relatively
modestly circumscribed. On the other hand, this form of opportunism infringes rather
aggressively on a core interest of contemporary constitutional and civil rights law:
protecting equal educational opportunities from hostile environment harassment.
In the case of campus anti-Semitism, we have seen that the First Amendment
narrative does not fully capture the range of issues which the problem generates. In
Professor Schauer's metaphor, this narrative is a pipe wrench, rather than a hammer,
swinging at a nail.2°° Worse, the argument has a questionable pedigree, in that it is
resonant with stereotypes of Jewish conspiratorial power, and it has been used in a
manner that can itself suppress efforts to promote equal educational opportunity.
The opportunistic use of First Amendment doctrine and rhetoric cannot be fully
addressed within the scope of existing doctrine, and its success or failure will
ultimately turn more on political or sociological factors than on jurisprudential
considerations. For these reasons, the danger of misusing the First Amendment in
this context is not only that it can distort First Amendment doctrine, weaken speech
198 See cases cited supra note 197.
1 Schauer, Speech-ing, supra note 13, at 360.
20 Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, supra note 11, at 175.
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protections by overextending them, and threaten equal educational opportunity. It
is also that our constitutional discourse is degraded by defenses of hate and bias
incidents which are both questionable in their moral genealogy and dangerous in
their impact on educational equality.
By way of a postscript, there are two noteworthy developments that occurred as
this Article was going to press. First, on November 30, 2007, the U.S. Department
of Education's Office for Civil Rights dismissed the anti-Semitism case against
Irvine.20' OCR found that each of the allegations against Irvine were untimely filed,
insufficiently supported factually, or that Irvine's response was sufficiently prompt
and effective. °2 While OCR's investigation has been criticized by other public
officials, Irvine interpreted the disposition as vindication of its position on
harassment as freedom of speech.20 3 Second, in February 2008, the independent
Task Force on Anti-Semitism at the University of California, Irvine, formed by the
Hillel Foundation of Orange County, 2°4 issued its final report two months after
OCR's closure letter was made public.20 ' The Task Force concluded that the "acts
of anti-Semitism are real and well documented" and that "Jewish students have been
harassed. '20 6 Recommending that Irvine take various action to rectify the climate
of anti-Semitism which the Task Force had found, the Task Force urged that
"students with a strong Jewish identity should consider enrolling elsewhere until
tangible changes are made. 20 7 On the other hand, at least Dean Chemerinsky
appears to be well ensconced in the law school.
20" Closure letter from Charles R. Love, Program Manager, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Office
for Civil Rights, Region IX, to Susan Tuchman, Director, Center for Law and Justice, Zionist
Organization of America (Nov. 30, 2007) (regarding OCR Case No. 09-05-2013).
202 Id. at 2-13.
203 See Marla Fisher, Civil Rights Investigation Clears UCI of Anti-Semitism Charges:
Agency Says Lack of Evidence in Allegations by Jewish Students, ORANGE COUNTY REG.,
Dec. 11,2007, available athttp://www.ocregister.com/news/students-jewish-campus-1939795-
officials-report.
204 See generally Michael Miller, Group to Probe Anti-Semitism, DAILY PILOT (Newport
Beach, Ca.), Feb. 15, 2007, available at http://www.dailypilot.com/articles/2007/02/19/
education/dpt-uci 1 6.txt.
205 TASK FORCE ON ANTI-SEMITISM AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE, REPORT,
available athttp://www.redcounty.con/rccampuswatch/Orange%20County%20Task%20Force
%20Report%20on%20anti-Semitism%20at%20UCI.pdf [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
206 Id. at 26; see also Brad A. Greenberg, Report Says UCI Is a Hostile Place for Jewish
Students, JEWISH J. Los ANGELES, Feb. 22, 2008, available at http://www.jewishjoumal
.com/home/preview.php?id+ 18953.
207 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 211, at 27.
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